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Don’t Give Up on Taxes
By Linda Sugin
Edward D. Kleinbard has written an important
book about the fiscal system, We Are Better Than This
(2015, Oxford University Press, New York. 509
pages. $24.22.). Now a member of the faculty at the
University of Southern California, Kleinbard was
previously the chief of staff of the Joint Committee
on Taxation and a partner at Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen
& Hamilton. He is among the finest tax lawyers of
his generation, and this book is an important con-
tribution to the public debate about taxes and
spending.
Kleinbard’s central thesis is that progressives are
mistaken in focusing on progressive taxation as a
policy goal. He argues that the size of the fiscal
system should be the central concern and that
progressives should make greater spending their
primary fiscal goal. A large fiscal system is more
important than progressive taxation because public
spending — by its nature — is progressive. Klein-
bard asserts that more government is the best route
to a ‘‘richer, more equal, and happier society.’’1
It is refreshing to see that someone who spent
time as the chief of staff of the JCT is fundamentally
optimistic about government. We are rarely re-
minded that government can be a force for good.
Nevertheless, it is disappointing that Kleinbard has
become a self-described tax apostate.
I am troubled by the increasing tendency of
scholars to find solutions to their own problems in
other people’s fields. As a tax lawyer, I am dis-
tressed when everyone else thinks taxes can solve
all our non-revenue problems: Tax carbon.2 Tax
guns.3 Tax soda.4 Tax executive pay.5 Tax traffic.6
This book suggests that instead of fixing the prob-
lems of our tax system, we should change the topic
to spending. The grass is always greener in the
other guy’s backyard because we can’t see the
weeds from where we’re standing.
By seizing on spending, the book sets up an
unfair comparison. If we are asking whether taxing
or spending is the more powerful tool, it’s no
contest — spending wins hands down. It’s not just
that a large fiscal system can support progressivity
better than a small one, as Kleinbard points out. It’s
that spending is just so much more powerful than
taxing. The only thing taxes can do is change prices.
Spending, however, can do anything. All creative
ideas for social progress require money. If you pit
taxing and spending against each other as alterna-
tives in designing public policy, taxes have to lose.
Kleinbard is clearly correct that the progressivity
of the whole fiscal system is important and that the
tax system, standing alone, has no independent
distributional significance.7 But that doesn’t mean
that the taxing side doesn’t matter. It’s not right to
ignore spending, but it’s also not right to ignore the
design of the tax system. Just as progressive spend-
ing can mitigate regressive taxation, a more pro-
gressive tax system can counteract less progressive
spending.
The decision whether to use taxes or spending
should depend on which has more real potential for
progressive effects. Kleinbard is optimistic about
what we might achieve on the spending side,
particularly in education and healthcare. I suspect
1This language is from Kleinbard’s book tour slides.
2There is widespread support for a carbon tax among
economists. See N. Gregory Mankiw, ‘‘Smart Taxes: An Open
Invitation to Join the Pigou Club,’’ 35 E. Econ. J. 14-23 (2009).
3See Lucinda Finley and John Culhane, ‘‘Make Gun Compa-
nies Pay Blood Money,’’ The New York Times, June 23, 2013.
4San Francisco and Berkeley, California, may be the first
localities in America to adopt such a tax. See ‘‘War on Sugar,’’
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2014-
10-28/berkeley-and-san-francisco-take-their-shot-at-soda-taxes.
5See David Walker, ‘‘Tax Response to the Executive Pay
Problem,’’ 93 B.U. L. Rev. 325 (2013).
6London does this. See https://www.tfl.gov.uk/modes/
driving/congestion-charge.
7I have said this myself. See Linda Sugin, ‘‘Theories of
Distributive Justice and Limitations on Taxation,’’ 72 Fordham L.
Rev. 1991 (2004).
Linda Sugin is a professor at Fordham Law
School.
Sugin discusses professor Edward D. Klein-
bard’s latest book about the fiscal system and the
broader implications of progressive taxation as a
policy goal.
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the reason for that optimism is that he’s a tax
person. Kleinbard’s proposals are so modest and
politically realistic on the tax side, but so ambitious
and unrealistic on the spending side. He proposes
reinstating the Clinton-era rates on all taxpayers
and reducing the value of some tax expenditures.8
At the same time, he advocates a single-payer plan
for health insurance. Many proponents of the Af-
fordable Care Act would surely have preferred that
option but were unable to achieve it. If there
weren’t substantial political economy barriers, we
might already have made better progress on greater
and more progressive spending.
The politics of the efforts on both the spending
side and the taxing side run parallel to each other.
The same forces that fight progressivity on the tax
side also fight it on the spending side. Based solely
on the data presented in the book, more progressive
spending seems virtually impossible. Look at all the
states that failed to expand Medicaid ‘‘solely for
spite,’’ as Kleinbard says. Grover Norquist wants
every politician to pledge never to raise taxes,9 but
he also wants to get government small enough to
drown it in a bathtub.10
Tax expenditures, which most tax scholars dis-
dain,11 seem the most promising way to attain
anything like progressive spending these days. I
have been a reluctant champion of tax expenditures
precisely because they seem to be the best way to
deliver benefits to the poor.12 The distributional
effects of tax expenditures are not what they were
40 years ago. We use the tax law for the most
substantial cash transfer program we have. Many
influential tax reform proposals — like the presi-
dent’s fiscal commission’s — lump together
corporate-welfare-type tax expenditures with the
earned income tax credit and argue that we should
get rid of all of them.13 Given how stingy Congress
has been recently, I’m not hopeful that we can get
more progressive direct spending. I’m more hopeful
about extending the enhanced earned income credit
or the refundable piece of the education credits.14
The only politically possible way to have big gov-
ernment these days is by making it look like taxes
are being cut. It is either inconsistent or politically
naive to argue for both bigger government and
fewer tax expenditures.
Kleinbard recognizes that there are fundamental
moral and philosophical questions that drive tax
policy and that those questions should be explicit.
Judging from his proposals, it seems Kleinbard does
not really want that much progressivity in the fiscal
system. The ideal contemplated in the book is a
fiscal system financed by the huge middle class but
that mostly serves the middle class also. There’s
nothing wrong with wanting only a modest level of
progressivity in the fiscal system. There’s no prin-
ciple that dictates the right level of progressivity; it
is a moral choice. It is on that moral choice that I
disagree with Kleinbard the most because even if
we spend more and better, I still believe taxes
matter.
Taxation is the most widespread and intrusive
interface between individuals and the government.
It involves a coercive exercise of government power.
It is appropriately a test of whether we govern
ourselves fairly. If the government operates the tax
system unjustly, there is no direct spending that can
cure those injustices. Every institution of govern-
ment must operate fairly.
What does it mean to govern ourselves fairly? In
general, all government institutions must respect
individuals as autonomous and equal. In taxation,
respecting individuals as autonomous and equal
requires allowing individuals to exert dominion
over what they deserve. We cannot construct a
theory of fair taxation without talking about what
we each deserve — as our share of the social
product and as our burden of society’s costs. What
are individuals entitled to own exclusively, and
what is justly allocated to communal resources? The
most fundamental tax fairness question asks what
should be treated as private property and what
should be treated as social product. There is no
pre-social division between private ownership and
public entitlement. Pretax income is a normatively
empty concept because it assumes people have
entitlements to amounts they do not morally de-
serve.
Fair shares also depend on context. Government
spending is part of that context, but the fiscal
system is not enough. Other factors are also rel-
evant to the question of fair shares. How markets
allocate returns is important. We live in a society in
8Kleinbard’s business tax plan, the business enterprise in-
come tax (BEIT), is admittedly more radical.
9Americans for Tax Reform, ‘‘Federal Taxpayer Protection
Pledge Questions and Answers,’’ available at http://www.atr.
org/federal-taxpayer-protection-questions-answers-a6204.
10See Paul Krugman, ‘‘The Tax-Cut Con,’’ The New York Times
Magazine, Sept. 14, 2003, at 57.
11Including Kleinbard in this book and elsewhere. See Klein-
bard, ‘‘The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expendi-
tures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes,’’ 36 Ohio
N.U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2010).
12Sugin, ‘‘Tax Expenditures, Reform, and Distributive Jus-
tice,’’ 3 Col. J. Tax L. 1 (2012).
13National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform,
‘‘The Moment of Truth,’’ at 29 (2010).
14Both of these enhanced refundable credits are scheduled to
expire at the end of 2017. See sections 32(b)(3) and 25A(i).
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which the returns to capital outstrip the returns to
labor, and the top 1 percent is doing much better
than everyone else.15 Markets are part of the social
structure that government institutions must ac-
count for in measuring fair shares. On the other
side, the contributions individuals make to the
social fabric are important, too. An individual’s
share should reflect whether her life is devoted to
improving prospects for others. Fair shares need to
account for what we contribute to society, as well as
what we take from it.
Once we account for social institutions, we all
deserve very little of what we have. A huge part of
everyone’s income and wealth is attributable to
factors for which we are not responsible. Moreover,
the share of income and wealth that comes from
being in society increases rapidly as income and
wealth go up. The benefits to high-income indi-
viduals provided by the social structure and the
government extend beyond anything that looks like
a transfer or even a public good. The basic infra-
structure of society benefits the wealthy compared
to the poor. That infrastructure includes the opera-
tion of markets and the monetary system, as well as
everything else that makes America an attractive
place to live, work, and invest. Social forces and
social cooperation produce many tangible and in-
tangible things that contribute to income and
wealth. The advantage of being part of society is
enormous for people who do well.
Let me be clear. I’m not in favor of a benefits tax,
which is an incoherent idea. We all enjoy infinite
benefits from social cooperation, since the baseline
for comparison should be the Hobbesian world in
which life is brutish and short. Instead, my point is
that social investment has implications for taxation
because it should make us think about what people
really deserve as their fair shares of private owner-
ship, and as a corollary, what are fair shares to
contribute to communal purposes. Substantially
more tax progressivity is necessary to appropriately
allocate returns to private property, on the one
hand, and returns to social cooperation, on the
other. Given the operation of institutions in our
society, more progressive taxes are necessary to
make the system — as a whole — one of fair shares.
On this question of moral fairness, Kleinbard
focuses primarily on the role luck plays in deter-
mining outcomes even when potential is the same.
Although he mentions John Rawls, Kleinbard’s
philosophical lodestar seems to be Ronald Dwor-
kin, whose ‘‘Equality of Resources’’16 largely paral-
lels the philosophical framework of Kleinbard. In
that essay, Dworkin explicitly developed the case
for a progressive income tax on an insurance model,
and his defining principle on moral fairness sepa-
rated luck from ambition. Unlike some other schol-
ars, I don’t think government, in general, or the tax
system, in particular, should have as its purpose
compensating people who have suffered bad luck.
While Rawls didn’t say much about taxation in
particular, he did believe that the principles of
justice must ‘‘specify the fair terms of social coop-
eration’’ and ‘‘regulate the division of benefits aris-
ing from social cooperation and allot the burdens
necessary to sustain it.’’17 Kleinbard’s focus on the
integrated fiscal system emulates Rawls in thinking
about how the interactions of different government
institutions add up. However, I think Rawls’s prin-
ciples of justice look at it both more narrowly and
more broadly and that Rawls was more demanding
of government institutions. Fairness in taxation
depends on how the tax system fits into the larger
social structure, taking into account institutions
beyond the fiscal system. It also requires that gov-
ernment use the power to tax, whenever possible, to
further every individual’s equal right to basic liber-
ties of citizenship, which was Rawls’s first and
primary principle of justice.18 So I would suggest
that taxation can do more to contribute to a just
society, and I hope that smart tax people, like
Kleinbard, don’t give up on it.
15Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014).
16Ronald Dworkin, ‘‘What Is Equality? Part II: Equality of
Resources,’’ 10 Philosophy and Public Affairs 283 (1981).
17John Rawls, Justice as Fairness 7 (2001).
18Rawls, A Theory of Justice 61 (1971).
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